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International Cooperation in Penal
Matters: The "Lockheed Agreements"
Bruno A. Ristau*

BACKGROUND
In February 1976, officials of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation testified
before a Senate committee that their company had paid $12.6 million in
bribes, commissions and fees to Japanese businessmen and government
officials to promote sales of Lockheed planes. 1 News of these bribes rocked
Japan's political establishment and governmental institutions. The Japanese Diet (parliament) passed a resolution urging that the United States
government disclose to the Diet the names of the Japanese officials involved in these bribes. 2 Prime Minister Takeo Mild sent a personal letter
to President Ford requesting that the United States make available all
information in its possession bearing on illicit payments in Japan. 3 Members of several Japanese political parties came to Washington and attended
the ongoing Senate hearings. 4 The Japanese press sent extra teams of
reporters to Washington who deluged the staffs of the Senate committees
with requests for the names of the corrupt Japanese officials or politicians.
The Lockheed company was only one of several American multinational
firms whose name was linked in Congressional testimony with the payment of bribes and kickbacks to officials or political figures in Asia, Europe
and Latin America in connection with military and commercial contracts.
On the heels of the revelations in Congress, numerous governments requested access to information regarding the alleged payoffs to their officials. The various governments forwarded their requests to the
Department of State, to the Department of Justice, to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, to Senate committees, and in one instance even to
the Comptroller General. It was evident that the United States Government faced a problem which, unless promptly resolved, could significantly
* The author, now in private practice with the firm of Kaplan, Russin, & Vecchi in
Washington, D.C., was formerly the Director of the Office of Foreign Litigation in the U.S.
Department of Justice. In that capacity he participated in the negotiations of the Lockheed
Agreements.
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affect the interests of the United States in its relations with several of its
principal allies. 5
The potential sources of the information sought by foreign governments
were: the Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, which was
looking into corporate political contributions in the United States and
abroad; the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was examining
the use of corporate funds for contributions, gifts, entertainment or other
expenses related to political activity; the Internal Revenue Service, which
was examining whether improper income tax deductions may have been
claimed by the companies involved; and the Department of Justice, which
was investigating possible violations of the False Statements Statute, 6 in
connection with the financing of some of the military sales programs
involved. The public was surprised to learn that the payment of bribes to
foreign officials as such did not constitute an offense under federal law.
Although the investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
had been in progress for some time, 7 the investigation by the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice was then only beginning, and the
limited information gathered was, at best, fragmentary and unevaluated.
The mounting foreign governmental requests for the names of those involved and for access to investigative files required a number of immediate
policy decisions by the White House and by the Departments of State and
Justice:
1. Should information from investigative fies of domestic law enforcement agencies be made available to foreign governments? To all foreign
governments who made a request, or only some governments? Was there
any legal authorization for the release of information to foreign governments bearing on potential offenses?
2. To whom could, or should, information be released? To foreign
governments generally? Only to foreign law enforcement agencies? To
legislative committees, and if so, to what kind of committees?
3. Should foreign governments be required to substantiate their requests
for information from domestic investigative agencies? If so, what substantiation or showing should be required?
4. Should information made available to foreign governments be limited
to such information as was gathered by domestic law enforcement agencies
in support of potential violations of domestic law, or should domestic
agencies affirmatively seek out information on behalf of foreign governments even though such information may not be germane to any domestic
investigation and potential prosecution?
5. If information were to be released to foreign governments, should
some kind of machinery be devised for its orderly transfer? What sort of
safeguards should be established to protect not only the rights of innocent
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parties whose names became involved in the bribery scandals, but also
those of potential defendants in the United States and abroad?
6. To what extent could information in the possession of the committees
of the Senate be made available to foreign governments? Clearly, the
executive branch did not have the right of access to the files of congressional committees, and it was up to the Senate to determine whether
information gathered by its staffs should be disclosed. Yet, as far as foreign
governments were concerned, they were now on notice that someone in
the United States Government had information impugning the integrity of
their officials, and they insisted on access to such information; foreign
officials were not concerned with the fine points of American constitutional law. Moreover, Secretary of State Kissinger had occasion to remind some
diplomatic missions in Washington that it was against diplomatic etiquette, if not against established rules of international law, for members
of diplomatic missions to approach the Congress directly, and that official
requests from foreign states should be made through customary diplomatic
channels through the Department of State. In short, the frustration on the
part of foreign states mounted; they were not allowed to approach the
Senate directly, and at the same time the Department of State was seemingly unable to secure the information from the legislative branch.
7. To what extent could information in the possession of the Securities
and Exchange Commission be made available to foreign governments? To
begin with, as an independent administrative agency, the Commission was
not subject to the direction and control of the executive. At the same time,
the Commission was not vested with any foreign policy responsibility and
it ought not to deal directly with foreign states. Here, too, foreign governments insisted that the executive branch make relevant information gathered by the S.E.C. available to them.
To complicate matters, some months earlier the S.E.C. had brought an
action against Lockheed in federal court in the District of Columbia to
enforce an administrative subpoena seeking documents bearing on the
payment of bribes to foreign officials. 8 In that action the Department of
Justice had filed, on behalf of the Department of State, a "suggestion of
interest," urging the court to order the subpoenaed documents sealed in
the ifies of the S.E.C. The suggestion focused on the potential harm to the
foreign policy interests of the government if the documents' allegations of
wrongdoing and corruption by foreign political leaders were not shielded
from premature or unauthorized disclosure. 9 Acceding to the suggestion,
the court ordered the subpoenaed documents produced but sealed in the
files of the agency. The court's order provided that if the agency decided
to release any subpoenaed documents to parties other than the Department
of Justice-for example, in response to a request from the Senate or a
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Freedom of Information Act request-Lockheed was to be given notice and
afforded an opportunity to challenge the proposed release in court. 10
Identification of these problems revealed that existing law made little
provision for mutual assistance and an orderly exchange of information
and evidence to foreign governments regarding offenses within the enforcement jurisdiction of both states-what in civil law countries is sometimes referred to as "kleine Rechtshilfe" or "petite entraide judiciaire." 11
Although the federal statute dealing with international judicial assistance
and cooperation had undergone a comprehensive revision in 1964, the
statute deals solely with the power of the federaljudiciary to render assistance
to foreign tribunals. 12 To this writer's knowledge, the executive had never
asked for, or proposed, legislation detailing the circumstances and conditions under which executive branch law enforcement agencies could, without the aid of a treaty or other international agreement, cooperate with
foreign authorities in the investigation and prosecution of transnational

offenses.

13

BLUEPRINT FOR THE AGREEMENTS
After a series of hurried consultations, the Departments of State and Justice, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Senate staff members
decided that the government should cooperate with the foreign investigations. The government would provide foreign authorities with information
from the files of domestic law enforcement agencies only if: the interested
foreign states agreed to formal arrangements; the exchange of information
and the rendition of assistance proceeded on a reciprocal basis; and the
government obtained adequate assurances that the information exchanged
would be safeguarded. In addition, if Senate investigating committees
determined that potential evidence in their files should be released to
foreign governments, the Department of Justice would serve as a conduit
for the transmission of the information abroad. No one in the government
was prepared to consider any scheme under which the government would
merely provide foreign authorities with the names of officials in high
places alleged to have received bribes from American companies. 14
The following considerations influenced the U.S. posture for the
negotiations with foreign governments on the exchange of investigative
information:
1. Government officials should not publicly disclose unverified allegations until appropriate authorities, either in this country or abroad, had an
opportunity to examine the reliability of the evidence. Much of the information available at that time consisted of documentation and fies supplied
by American corporations in response to subpoenas issued by the S.E.C.
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and by the Senate. These files included day-to-day correspondence between the American companies and their commission agents abroad. Even
a cursory review showed that various foreign agents were inclined to
exaggerate the value of their services, the level of their contacts, and the
sums of money required to achieve the objective of selling expensive
military equipment and aircraft. Some agents tended to justify their demands for more money by claiming the necessity of making "political
contributions" in order to secure purchase orders. Clearly, the mere
suggestion, by a commission agent abroad, of the improprieties of powerful foreign government officials, was of little probative value. 15 Although
much of the information in the hands of American investigating agencies
pertained to potential offenses committed by foreigners abroad, rudimentary fairness required that this information not be publicly revealed until
its trustworthiness had been investigated by proper law enforcement officials abroad and a determination made that formal charges be brought or
other disciplinary action taken.
2. Because of domestic political pressure, several foreign states insisted
on the immediate disclosure of the names of the corrupt officials. However,
the United States responded that the concept of fairness is central to the
principles of human rights. For example, Articles 55 and 56 of the U.N.
Charter provide that all United Nations members undertake to promote
human rights. 16 Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 17 guarantees the individual the protection of the law against arbitrary interference with his privacy and against "attacks against his honor
and reputation." These established principles clearly mandated efforts by
all countries concerned to protect the rights of persons whose names
became linked with these bribery scandals.
3. The authority of the Department of Justice to negotiate formal evidence-exchange agreements was within the Attorney General's plenary
authority, as chief law enforcement officer of the United States, to detect
and prosecute crimes against the United States. 18 Release of materials
from active investigative files to foreign law enforcement authorities could,
however, be justified only on the grounds that the agreements would
protect the confidentiality of these materials 19 and enable the Department
of Justice to benefit from the foreign government's investigation and in this
manner further the domestic investigation and potential prosecution. This
justification also mandated that the evidence-exchange agreements be limited to ongoing or impending investigations relating to specific companies.
4. To preclude any possible argument that the Department of Justice
was partial to a given foreign law enforcement agency, the arrangements
to be reached with different states should ideally be identical as to terms
and conditions.
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5. All arrangements agreed upon would be executive agreements and
would be publicized at once.
6. The United States would transmit information from congressional
committees to foreign governments subject to all conditions and strictures
that may be agreed upon with respect to materials from the investigative
files of the Department of Justice and other law enforcement agencies.
7. Foreign authorities could obtain information and evidence in the
possession of the Securities and Exchange Commission in the same manner
in which the Department of Justice routinely obtains information from the
S.E.C. for its own investigations. 20 If relevant to a foreign government's
request, the United States would provide the foreign authority with the
information under the terms and conditions of the contemplated evidenceexchange arrangements. As to information obtained by the S.E.C. from
Lockheed in obedience to subpoenas, the Department of Justice would
notify Lockheed of the intended release of such materials to a foreign
agency and Lockheed would be afforded the opportunity to challenge the
proposed release in court (although the consensus was that this was not
legally required).
On March 11, 1976, in response to Prime Minister Miki's request of
February 24 for information and evidence from the United States, President Ford proposed that an arrangement be worked out between the two
countries along the following lines:
I suggest that officials of our two governments meet without delay to work
out such arrangements. These procedures would permit law enforcement
officials from Japan to work in close cooperation with their counterparts here,
with access, on a confidential basis, to relevant information held by United
States investigatory agencies. The legal and administrative practice of the
SEC is not to make public any material relating to an investigation until the
investigation is completed. Premature disclosure of such information could
well prejudice the investigation and any law enforcement actions which
might ultimately be taken in the United States. It could also prejudice the
rights of individuals, whether or not they may ultimately become defendants
in criminal actions. These basic requirements of United States law and practice must be respected, as of course must those of Japan. If these principles
are protected, I am sure we can work together effectively. 21
The factors listed by the President served as the basis for all evidenceexchange agreements negotiated thereafter. 22
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENTS
In early March 1976, the Department of Justice embarked upon a long
series of negotiations with representatives of foreign states. In the ensuing
three years, some twenty-four evidence-exchange and cooperation agreements were concluded. 23
In the broadest sense, the agreements impose a reciprocal obligation on
the parties to cooperate in criminal investigations and spell out the procedures for the exchange of evidence and for cooperation between the Department of Justice and foreign law enforcement agencies. They envisage
close consultations between the parties so that the activities of law enforcement agencies in one country should not adversely affect investigations in the other. They mandate that, during the period of investigation,
the evidence exchanged be treated as confidential. Although the cooperation mutually pledged was limited to investigations respecting specific
target companies named in the agreements, the procedures could be extended to other companies that become future targets of investigation
either in this country or abroad.
The first agreement was concluded with Japan on March 23, 1976, and
came into force the same day. 24 It was followed in short order by almost
identical agreements with Italy and the Netherlands. Since all subsequent
agreements followed almost verbatim the language employed, and the
pattern developed, in the Japanese agreement, the provisions of that agreement will be highlighted in the following paragraphs.
Parties to the Agreements
The named parties to all agreements are the United States Department of
Justice and its foreign counterparts. In the Japanese agreement, as in most
other instances, the foreign counterpart is the Ministry of Justice. 25
In the case of the Netherlands, the counterpart was a special commission
-the "Netherlands Commission of Three"-established by the Council of
Ministers to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by a member of the
Royal House. This was due to a Dutch constitutional provision pursuant
to which members of the Royal House are not subject to the jurisdiction
of ordinary law enforcement agencies; allegations of wrongdoing by such
members must be investigated by special bodies established for that purpose.
Nature of the Agreements
The evidence-exchange agreements are binding international agreements.
In the context of American domestic law, they are "executive agreements."
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The sources of the power to negotiate these executive exchange agreements are: the plenary authority of the President to conduct the foreign
relations of the Nation; 26 the President's authority as Chief Executive, in
whom all law enforcement authority of the National Government ultimately reposes; 27 and the Attorney General's authority to detect and
prosecute crimes against the United States. 28
In their initial discussions, the U.S. negotiating team and its foreign
counterparts spent much time on the nature of the arrangements to which
the Department of Justice would agree. Representatives of several foreign
states approached the discussions with the preconception that the Department of Justice would negotiate a general treaty on mutual assistance in
criminal matters. Some foreign officials knew that the United States had
recently concluded a bilateral mutual assistance treaty with Switzerland, 29
and these officials urged that the occasion was propitious to negotiate a
similar, permanent treaty arrangement with their countries. The U.S.
negotiators had to stress repeatedly that they had no mandate from the
Secretary of State to negotiate a general treaty on mutual assistance in
criminal matters. They were authorized to seek an agreement on a technical
evidence-exchange and cooperation arrangement with foreign law enforcement authorities, limited to ongoing or impending criminal investigations involving allegations of bribery of foreign officials by specific
American multinational corporations.
Moreover, under American constitutional law, a general agreement on
mutual assistance in criminal matters, entered into in the name of the
United States and binding all agencies and instrumentalities of the government, would probably have to take the form of a treaty; 30 this, in turn,
would require the involvement of the Senate of the United States-a
procedure which could take years. When the U.S. team pointed out that
the negotiations with Switzerland regarding a mutual assistance treaty
began as early as 1969, that the treaty was signed in May of 1973, and that
ratification had not yet been advised by the Senate as of March 1976, the
foreign teams' treaty bias rapidly waned. It was simply unrealistic to
expect a treaty arrangement to be negotiated and to enter into force in a
matter of days or weeks.
Finally, the U.S. team pointed out that these legal realities necessarily
led to yet another limitation imposed by American law, namely, any procedures agreed upon would have to be consistent with existing federal statutes. This meant that the parties could not establish new substantive legal
rules under these technical cooperation agreements. The U.S. negotiators
could not impose new obligations upon federal courts at variance with the
powers which Congress had conferred upon them in regard to international judicial assistance. 31
These constraints have led some foreign observers to question the bind-
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ing character of the Lockheed Agreements. Thus, one Italian commentator
speculated:
From a purely subjective point of view the Agreement would, in fact, appear
as a mere understanding between State organs (the American Department of
Justice and the Italian Ministry of Justice) with no legal content and having
only a political and moral worth. 32
An analysis of the agreements-in light of the criteria applied by the
Department of State in determining whether a binding international agreement has come into existence-refutes this speculation. The relevant criteria are: (1) intention of the parties to be bound in international law; (2)
significance of the arrangement; (3) requisite specificity, including objective criteria for determining enforceability; (4) the necessity for two or
more parties to the arrangement; and (5) proper form. 33
As regards the intention of the parties, it is manifest that the Department of Justice and its foreign counterpart intended to be bound by the
evidence-exchange and cooperation arrangements. Most of the agreement
is couched in mandatory terms 34 and it imposes reciprocal obligations on
the parties which, in the absence of the agreement, would not exist.
The significance of the arrangement should be self-evident. These were
not minor or trivial undertakings, but formal arrangements between cabinet-level departments of two states, dealing with a matter of immense
public interest in both countries. The parties undertook substantial obligations.
The arrangements are as specific as could be expected under the circumstances. For example, Article 2 of the Japanese agreement provides that
"the parties shall use their best efforts to make available to each other
... statements, depositions, documents, business records, correspondence
or other materials, available to them." Similarly, Article 7 requires that
"the parties shall use their best efforts to assist in the expeditious execution
of letters rogatory." The best effort standard is frequently employed in
international agreements, and requires good faith efforts by the parties to
accomplish a desired result. This standard does not-and under the circumstances, could not-guarantee that the desired result would in each
instance be accomplished. It would have been unrealistic for the parties,
for example, to undertake an absolute obligation to produce specified
evidence or to give assurance that a domestic court would execute all
letters rogatory. While the negotiations were in progress neither party
could predict with any degree of certainty what items of information or
evidence its future investigations might uncover, or how a domestic court
would treat a letter rogatory submitted by the judicial authorities of the
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other state. The exigencies of the situation simply dictated the use of the
best efforts standard.
The remaining criteria were also satisfied. Clearly, there were two parties to each of the agreements. The agreements were incorporated in formal
instruments (some of them executed in two languages) 35 and were signed
by high-ranking government officials (on behalf of the United States by
sub-cabinet officers; on behalf of foreign states either by sub-cabinet officers or by ambassadors). Furthermore, as a matter of United States domestic
law, the agreements were reported to the Senate and published in the
United States Treaties Series, a requirement imposed by the Case Act 36 on
all binding international agreements.
In this writer's view, the suggestion that the Lockheed Agreements were
not binding international agreements is without substance. 37
Reciprocal Obligations Assumed by the Parties
The Japanese agreement obligated the parties to exchange relevant and
material information (statements, depositions, documents, business
records and correspondence) relating to the sales activities in Japan of the
Lockheed company and its subsidiaries and affiliates. 38 The parties could
use this information only for investigations conducted by law enforcement
agencies in the requesting country, or for evidence in any ensuing legal
proceedings. 39
All information exchanged-and correspondence between the parties
relating to it-was to be confidential. The agreements prohibited the disclosure of the information to third parties or to government agencies
having no law enforcement responsibilities. 40 Should any information
provided to investigative agencies be needed as evidence in court, the
parties were obligated to provide authentication, certifications or any assistance necessary to render the evidence admissible in court. 41
Confidentiality and Limitations on Assistance
In the event of a breach of confidentiality by one party, the other party
could discontinue the evidence-exchange and cooperation under the
agreement. 42 Yet, information exchanged by investigative agencies could
be used as evidence in any ensuing criminal, civil or administrative court
proceedings, and once such court proceedings were initiated the confidentiality requirement ceased. 43 The parties would render assistance subject
to all the limitations imposed by the domestic law of their states. Moreover, assistance could be delayed or denied if execution would interfere
with, or prejudice, a pending investigation in the requested state. 44 Assistance to be rendered in a requested state did not include such acts as might
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result in the immunization of any person from prosecution in that state. 45
In addition, assistance rendered under the agreements would be solely for
the benefit of the investigative agencies of the parties and not for the
benefit of third parties (other states or private entities). 46
The agreements further postulated the evident proposition that the
agreements did not limit in any way the right to utilize information obtained by the parties independent of the agreements. 47 There was generally no specific provision for the entry into force and the termination of the
agreements. The negotiators intended that the agreements would enter
into force once they were signed, unless the domestic law of a party
required implementing legislation. The agreements would lapse once the
investigation of the target company was completed here and abroad. If,
prior to its termination, an agreement was expressly extended to another
target company, the termination of the investigation of that company
would control the termination of the agreement. 48

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS
Following the signing or the entry into force of the agreements, the Department of Justice turned over thousands of documents, business records
and items of correspondence to its opposite parties under the various
agreements. At the request of foreign law enforcement authorities, agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation assisted on numerous occasions in
locating and interviewing potential witnesses in the United States. When
requested, the agents approached potential witnesses and inquired whether they would be willing to be interviewed in this country by representatives of foreign investigative agencies. When the answer was in the
affirmative, federal agents and U.S. attorneys arranged for interviews of
witnesses by foreign law enforcement officers (and in the case of the Dutch
investigation by members of the Commission of Three).
In accordance with its obligations under the agreements the Department
of Justice frequently assisted foreign countries in the execution of letters
rogatory. In one case, the Tokyo District Court requested the depositions
of three former officials of Lockheed who had declined interview by Japanese officials. The Japanese court transmitted the letters rogatory, dated
May 28, 1976, to the U.S. Department of Justice. One week later, the
department presented the letters to the United States District Court for the
Central District of California (in Los Angeles). The court entered an order
appointing as chief commissioner a retired California state judge and two
co-commissioners (representatives of the Department of Justice) with the
power to subpoena the witnesses and to examine them. 49 The witnesses
challenged the designation of the commissioners and their procedure.
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After the district court rejected their arguments, the prospective witnesses
appealed. The Ninth Circuit heard the appeal on the record below, and
affirmed the district court's order in less than four weeks. 50
Thereafter, the court-appointed commissioners examined the witnesses.
The district court directed that the transcript of their testimony be sealed
and not be transmitted to the Tokyo District Court. Before releasing the
testimony, the U.S. court required assurances from the Japanese authorities
that the witnesses would not be prosecuted in Japan based on their
testimony given in response to the Japanese letters rogatory. 51
Although Japanese prosecutors do not have the power to immunize
witnesses (as is probably the case in most civil law jurisdictions), resourceful Japanese lawyers prevailed upon the Attorney General of Japan to
present a "Letter of Declaration" to the Supreme Court of Japan. The
Attorney General's declaration stated in pertinent part:
prosecution against these witnesses in connection with their testimony
would not be instituted in accordance with Article 248 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of Japan, even if any matter contained in their testimony
or in any other information which might be obtained as the result of their
testimony might constitute a violation of Japanese law. 52
The Court accepted the letter as binding by issuing its own "Declaration." 53 Based on this official Japanese declaration, the district court in Los
Angeles released the witnesses' testimony and directed that it be transmitted to the Tokyo trial court.
To this writer's knowledge, the United States invoked Article 4 sanctions-termination of cooperation-only twice. In one instance, two members of the Italian Parliament discussed, in a sensational radio interview,
the contents of certain materials obtained from the Department of Justice,
which had been released by the Italian Ministry of Justice to a parliamentary investigating committee. 54 The Department of Justice temporarily
suspended the transmission of further materials until the Italian Ministry
of Justice and the chairman of the parliamentary investigating committee
assured the U.S. government they would take all possible steps to ensure
the confidentiality of the investigative files furnished by the Department
of Justice. 55
In the other instance, the United States terminated the agreement with
Nigeria because Nigerian authorities had released materials obtained from
the American government to the local press. The Nigerian agreement,
however, was reinstated two years later and extended to an investigation
of another company. 56
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CONCLUSION
In the Netherlands, the "Committee of Three" investigated the connection
of Prince Bernhard with certain Lockheed sales activities in the Netherlands. In due course, the Prince was officially censured for his conduct. 57
In Italy, prosecutors charged former Premier Mariano Rumor with corruption as a result of the investigations conducted by the Italian Parliament. 58
Former Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was also indicted as a
result of the investigation conducted by the Tokyo public prosecutor. 59
Public records do not disclose how much the information and material
furnished by the Department of Justice aided the foreign investigations.
Yet, the probative value of the American material appears to have been
substantial.
In the course of the Lockheed investigations, the Department of Justice
provided much more material to foreign investigative agencies than it
obtained in return from foreign law enforcement agencies. The Department also furnished more assistance to foreign agencies than it received.
This was to be expected, considering the different scopes of the investigations conducted abroad. Moreover, the Lockheed Agreements surely yielded important benefits for the United States: they averted grave
consequences for U.S. foreign relations.
The unique experience in international law enforcement assistance
gained by the Department of Justice as a result of the Lockheed scandals
should not merely grace a new chapter in the Department's official history.
The government should seek to avoid the hectic negotiation of technical
cooperation procedures with foreign law enforcement authorities to establish a basis for reciprocal transnational assistance. The Department should
propose, and the Congress should pass, a federal statute conferring upon
the Attorney General permanent authority to render assistance to foreign
law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of offenses. 60
A statute covering international assistance in criminal investigations
should grant the Attorney General delegable authority to conduct-at the
request of foreign law enforcement agencies-investigations in the United
States of offenses committed abroad (excluding political offenses or
offenses which are offensive to the public policy of the United States). The
Attorney General should also have the power to exempt from the coverage
of the Freedom of Information Act files, records, materials and information
received from foreign law enforcement authorities in support of requests
for assistance. Finally, the federal courts should have jurisdiction to issue
subpoenas and search warrants in aid of foreign criminal investigations,
after foreign authorities have shown probable cause to the Attorney General without qualifications; or its exercise could be dependent upon the
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Attorney General finding that it is in the national interest to render the
assistance requested. U.S. assistance could also be made subject to reciprocity. 61
Although one can only speculate as to the reception which such a
legislative proposal might receive in the Congress, the nation's chief lawenforcement official dearly lacks express statutory authority to render
effective assistance to his counterparts abroad in the fight against international crime. Congress should welcome the opportunity to shape the nation's policy in this area, and not leave it to ad hoc and unilateral action by
the executive branch through executive agreements.
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This treaty is interpreted and applied in United States v. A. L. Burbank and Co., Ltd., 525
F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976).
For an agreement on exchange of customs information, see Agreement Regarding Mutual
Assistance between Customs Services, Aug. 23, 1973, United States-Federal Republic of
Germany, 26 U.S.T. 1092, T.I.A.S. No. 8098. See also Agreement Relating to Reciprocal Assistance in Penal Matters, brought about by an exchange of notes at Bonn, Nov. 7, 1960, Dec.
28, 1960, and Jan. 3, 1961, United States-Federal Republic of Germany, 12 U.S.T. 1156,
T.I.A.S. No. 4826.
14 For an opposing view, see Cohen, Lockheed Cover Up?, N.Y.Times, Mar. 29, 1976, at 29,
col. 3. The article states in part:
[Miany have asked, should the United States try to tell the Japanese people how they
ought to use information essential to the cleansing of their own political process? Is
it for us to determine how Japan should weigh the conflicting claims, on the one hand,
of the need for Parliament and the people to avoid a cover-up and, on the other, the
need to protect Japanese officials from unfair publicity?
15 Indeed, in one instance a foreign commission agent conceded that although he reported
to the American company the expenditure of certain sums to bribe a government official, in
truth he kept the money for himself.
16 U.N. CHARTER, arts. 55, 56.
17 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III) (1948), reprinted in 5
M. WHITEmAN,DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 237-242 (1965).
18 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 533 (1976).
19 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1976). This section authorizes the Attorney General to exchange
investigative information with "and for the official use of authorized officials of the Federal
Government, the States, cities, and penal and other institutions." The practice under this
statute is to require the recipient to treat the investigative files as confidential. Because of the
nature of criminal investigations the government cannot permit investigative files to be
disseminated to unauthorized parties. Paragraph (b) of section 534 permits the immediate
cancellation of the exchange of information if the recipient disseminates the information to
unauthorized parties. The policy underlying section 534 applies mutatis mutandis to the exchange of investigative files with foreign agencies.
20 See Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 404 F.Supp. at 653-654, which states in part:
[Nothing contained in the Order shall affect the ability of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to... (ii) refer documents or information to an agency of the government
with law enforcement responsibilities . . .or (iii) . . . [refer] information to the
Department of Justice, or report of investigation, provided for under the Securities Act
of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Investment Company Act of 1940,
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, or the Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935....
21 Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to Prime Minister Takeo Miki (March 11, 1976)
(on fie with the MicnGAN YEARBOOK OF INTRNATI ONAL LscAL STUDIES).
22 These agreements are commonly but somewhat inaccurately called "Lockheed Agree-
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ments," as a number of other multinational companies have become the targets of investigations and the subjects of later agreements.
23 Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Administration of Justice in Connection with the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, Mar. 23, 1976, United States-Japan, 27 U.S.T. 946,
T.I.A.S. No. 8233, extended to include McDonnell Douglas and Grumman by an agreement
effected by exchange of letters, Jan. 20 and 22,1979, 30 U.S.T. 3473, T.I.A.S. 9400; Procedure
for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation Matter, March 29,1976, United States-Italy, 27 U.S.T. 3437, T.I.A.S. No.
8374; Procedures for Mutual Assistance, March 29, 1976, United States-Netherlands, 27
U.S.T. 1064, T.I.A.S. No. 8245; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of
Justice in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, Apr. 20, 1976, United
States-Nigeria, 27 U.S.T. 1054, T.I.A.S. No. 8243, extended to include IT&T by exchange of
letters, March 8, 26, 1979; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice
in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, Apr. 22,1976, United StatesColombia, 27 U.S.T. 1059, T.I.A.S. No. 8244, extended to include Textron Inc. by exchange
of letters, July 7, 15, 1980, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. 9809, extended to include Bethlehem
Steel Corp. by exchange of letters, Aug. 29, Sept. 10, 1980, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No 9860;
Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, May 20, 1976, United States-Greece, 27 U.S.T. 2006,
T.I.A.S. No. 8300; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in
Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, May 21, 1976, United StatesBelgium, 27 U.S.T. 1966, T.I.A.S. No. 8292; Procedures for the Mutual Assistance in the
Administration of Justice in Connection with the General Tire & Rubber Company and the
Firestone Tire & Rubber Company Matters, June 23, 1976, United States-Mexico, 28 U.S.T.
2083, T.I.A.S. No. 8533, extended to include McDonnell Douglas Corporation by exchange
of letters, Feb. 23, Mar. 6,1978, 29 U.S.T. 2153 T.I.A.S. No. 8930, extended to include J. Aron
& Company and the Israel Coffee Company by exchange of letters, May 31, June 1, 1978,
29 U.S.T. 3200, T.I.A.S. No. 9005, extended to include IT&T by exchange of letters, Nov. 17,
Dec. 5,1978,30 U.S.T. 2177; T.I.A.S. No. 9322; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation Matters, July 8, 1976, United States-Turkey, 27
U.S.T. 3419, T.I.A.S. No. 8371, extended to include IT&T by exchange of letters, June 18, 26,
1979, 30 U.S.T. 6072, T.I.A.S. No. 9539, extension, July 8, 15, 1980, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S.
No. 9810; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor of the Spanish Supreme Court in Connection
with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, July 14,1976, United States-Spain, 27 U.S.T.
3409, T.I.A.S. No. 8370, extended to include the Boeing Corporation by exchange of letters,
June 7, July 22, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 7494, T.I.A.S. No. 8725; Procedures for Mutual Assistance
in Administration of Justice in Connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter,
Sept. 13, 1976, United States-Australia, 27 U.S.T. 3424, T.I.A.S. No. 8372; Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the Federal Minister of Justice of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Sept. 24, 1976, United States-Germany, 27 U.S.T. 3429, T.I.
A.S. No. 8373, extended to include the McDonnell Douglas Corporation by exchange of
letters, Jan. 10, Feb. 1, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 3533, T.I.A.S. No. 9407; Procedures for Mutual
Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with the Boeing Company Matter,
Mar. 15, 1977, United States-Canada, 28 U.S.T. 2463, T.I.A.S. No. 8567; Agreement on
Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice and the
Ministry of Justice of Venezuela in Connection with the Boeing Company Matter, May 31,
1977, United States-Venezuela, 28 U.S.T. 5219, T.I.A.S. No. 8623, extended to include the
McDonnell Douglas Corporation by exchange of letters, Dec. 6, 8, 1978, 30 U.S.T. 2254,
T.I.A.S. No. 9333; Agreements on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United
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States Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice of Iran in Connection with Matters
Relating to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Grumman Corporation and Northrop Corporation, June 14, 1977, United States-Iran, 28 U.S.T. 5205, T.I.A.S. No. 8621; Agreement on
Procedure for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice and the
Ministry of Home Affairs of India in Connection with Matters Relating to the Boeing
Company, Aug. 19,1977, United States-India, 28 U.S.T. 7497, T.I.A.S. No. 8726; Agreement
on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice and
the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, in Connection with Matters Relating to
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the Boeing Company, Sept. 9, 1977, United StatesPakistan, 28 U.S.T. 7488, T.I.A.S. No. 8724, extended to include the McDonnell Douglas
Corporation by exchange of letters, Jan. 6, 10, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 492, T.I.A.S. No. 8827; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice
and the Attorney General's Chambers of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, in Connection with Matters Relating to the Boeing Company, Sept, 23, 1977, United States-Sudan, 28
U.S.T. 7482, T.I.A.S. No. 8723; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance in Connection with Matters Relating to the Boeing Company, Oct. 6, 1978, United States-Kuwait, extended to include the McDonnell Douglas Corporation by
U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -,
exchange of letters, Dec. 21, 1978, Jan. 2, 1979, - U.S.T. - , T.I.A.S. No. - ; Agreement
on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice and
the Ministry of Justice of the United Arab Republic of Egypt in Connection with Matters
Relating to the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Nov. 29, 1978, United States-Egypt, 30
U.S.T. 3996, T.I.A.S. No. 9441 extended to include the Boeing Company by exchange of
letters, Dec. 21, 1978, Jan. 3,1979,30 U.S.T. 4005, T.I.A.S. No. 9442, extended to include the
Beajay Products Corporation by exchange of letters, Mar. 19, Apr. 17, 1979, 30 U.S.T. 4007,
T.I.A.S. 9443; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States
Department of Justice and the Ministry of Law and Justice of Nepal in Connection with
Matters Relating to the Boeing Company, Jan. 5, 1979, United States-Nepal, 30 U.S.T. 2495,
T.I.A.S. No. 9347; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States
Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Togo in Connection with
Matters Relating to the Gulfstream American Corporation, Formerly Known as Grumman
American Aviation Corporation, Jan. 30, 1979, United States-Togo, 30 U.S.T. 3477, T.I.A.S.
No. 9401; Agreement on Procedures for Mutual Assistance Between the United States Department of Justice and the Ministry of Justice and Police of the Republic of Surinam in
Connection with Matters Relating to the Reynolds Metals Company, Mar. 14, 1979, United
States-Surinam, 30 U.S.T. 3864, T.I.A.S. No. 9429; Procedures for Mutual Assistance in
Connection with Matters Relating to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Aug. 8,1979, United
States-Peru, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. - [all of these treaties hereinafter cited as U.S.-(name
of other country) Agreement].
24 Procedures for Mutual Assistance in the Administration of Justice in Connection with
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Matter, Mar. 23, 1976, United States-Japan, 27 U.S.T. 946,
T.I.A.S. No. 8233 [hereinafter cited as U.S.-Japan Agreement].
25 See U.S.-Japan Agreement, supra note 24, preamble.
26 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
27 See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
28 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 533 (1976).
29 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United StatesSwitzerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302.
30 See generally L. HENKiN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER, H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAW 149-158
(1980).
31 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1696, 1781-1782 (1976).
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32 DiLieto, The Lockheed Agreement. A Non-Binding Legal Agreement, 3 ITmAN Y.B. INT'L L. 243,

244 (1977).
33 Memorandum from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, to key
Department of State personnel (March 12,1976) (entitled Criteriafor Determining What Constitutes
an InternationalAgreement), reprinted in 4 DIG. U.S. PRAc. INT'L L. 263, 265. See generally Comment,
The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
34 See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Agreement, supra note 24, at arts. 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8.
35 See, e.g., the agreements with Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Spain, supra
note 23.
36 1 U.S.C. § 1126 (1976).
37 It is manifest that the Italian government regarded the Agreement as a binding international agreement, since it took immediate steps to implement it by domestic legislation.
Because of the unusual nature of that legislation, it is reproduced here in ful:
Decree-Law No. 76 of April 1, 1976
Provisions for the application of the Agreement concluded on March 29, 1976,
between the Ministry of Justice of the Italian Republic and the Department of Justice
of the United States of America.
The President of the Republic
In view of Article 77(2) of the Constitution;
Considering the urgent need that provisions be issued for the application of the
Agreement, attached to this Decree, concluded on March 29,1976 between the Ministry of Justice of the Italian Republic and the Department of Justice of the United States
of America on mutual assistance to the judicial or police authorities of the two States
with respect to alleged illicit commercial activities carried out in Italy by the Lockheed
Corporation and by its subsidiaries or affiliates;
Having heard the Council of Ministers;
On the proposal of the Minister of Justice, with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and of the Interior concurring;
Hereby Decrees
Article I
In this Decree the term "Agreement" designates the aforesaid Agreement concluded on March 29, 1976, between the Ministry of Justice of the Italian Republic and the
Department of Justice of the United States of America for mutual assistance in judicial
and police investigations of alleged illegalities in commercial activities in Italy committed by the Lockheed Corporation and some of its subsidiaries or affiliates.
Under this Decree, judicial authorities shall for all purposes be considered to
include also the bodies established for indictment proceedings under Article 96 of the
Constitution.
Article 2
For the purposes and within the limits stipulated by the Agreement, at the request
of the competent judicial and police authorities, the Minister of Justice shall petition
the United States Department of Justice for information and documents deemed pertinent for the purposes of the investigations being conducted by the aforesaid authorities in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings concerning alleged illegalities in
commercial activities in which Lockheed Corporation and its subsidiaries or affiliates
have engaged in Italy.
The records thus acquired shall be turned over by the Minister of Justice to the
requesting authorities after each title page has been stamped to indicate the confidentiality and restricted use stipulated by this Decree.
The authorities who obtain delivery of such documents must safeguard their
confidentiality; they may not reveal them to third parties nor use them for purposes
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other than the aforesaid proceedings and in compliance with the stipulations of the
following Article.
Article 3
The judicial and police authorities may for no purpose in criminal, civil, or administrative proceedings use the documents acquired in accordance with the preceding
Article until the Minister of Justice, whom they must notify, has informed them that
the United States Department of Justice has been consulted in accordance with paragraph 6 of the Agreement which is applicable to both Parties.
Article 4
Interrogations conducted in the United States of America of persons residing there
by the Italian judicial and police authorities shall be admissible for all purposes in the
criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings referred to in this Decree provided that
they are conducted in accordance with the terms and guarantees stipulated by the
Agreement.
Likewise, depositions, statements, and documents acquired in the United States of
America in compliance with the rules of procedure prescribed by Italian law shall be
admissible for the aforementioned purposes.
Gazetta Ufficiale della Repubblica Italiana [Gaz. Uff.] No. 90, April 6, 1976, translated and
reprinted in DEPARTtENT OF STATE DIISION OF LANGUAGE SERVICES, LS No. 55788 (1976).
38 See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Agreement, supra note 24 at art. 2. The agreements did not require
governments to substantiate their need for the information which they requested.
39 Id. at art. 3.
40 Id. at art. 4. In the case of the U.S.-Italy Agreement, to ensure that the confidentiality
provisions were observed by Italian investigating magistrates (who are members of the
judiciary) and by Parliamentary bodies, the Italian Ministry of Justice undertook the obligation to propose immediately the passage of implementing legislation. See supra note 37.
The Italian Agreement also contained in Article 4 the unusual provision that "[S]hould
a subsequent change in the domestic law impair the ability of the requesting state, or an
agency thereof, to carry out the terms set forth herein, the requesting state shall promptly
return all materials made available hereunder to the requested state."
41 See U.S.-Japan Agreement, supra note 24, at art. 5.
42 Id. at art. 4, para. 2.
43 Id. at art. 7.
44 Id. at art. 9.
45 Id. at art. 8.
46 Id. at art. 11.
47 Id. at art. 10.
48 See U.S. DEPrT oF STATE, OFFIcE or THE LEcAL ADVISER, TREATIES INFoRCE-A LIST OF TREATS
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1981 116,
which lists all "Lockheed Agreements" as still being in force. It is probable, however, that
a number of them have since lapsed as a result of termination of the investigations of the
target companies both in this country and abroad.
49 Note, 15 I.L.M. 1010 (1976).
50 In re Letters Rogatory From the Tokyo District, Tokyo, Japan, 539 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir.
1976).
51 Note, supra note 49, at 1010.
52 Id. at 1015.
53 Id.
54 Washington Post, Apr. 25, 1976, at A13, col. 5.
55 The U.S. Department of Justice described these assurances in a press release:
Dr. Brancaccio, Director of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Justice of Italy, held meet-
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ings for the past three days with Attorney General Levi, Assistant Attorney General
Thornburgh, and other Department of Justice officials. Dr. Brancaccio presented the
views of the Italian Minister of Justice, Mr. Bonifacio, concerning allegations of improper disclosures of information provided to Italian law enforcement authorities by
the United States Department of Justice pursuant to the agreement of March 29, 1976,
relating to the Lockheed matter. He also informed the Department of Justice that
Minister Bonifacio had met with Chairman Castelli and the two Vice-Chairmen,
Spagnoli and Reggiani, of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee in charge of
investigating allegations of improper conduct by high-ranking Italian officials, and
that the leadership of the Committee had given assurances that the confidentiality
requirements of the March 29 agreement would be scrupulously observed by all
members of the Committee.
Dr. Brancacdo informed the Department of Justice that the Italian Parliament had
passed implementing legislation enacting the provisions of the agreement of March 29
as a matter of Italian domestic law. All political parties voted unanimously in favor
of the legislation. He further stated that breach of the confidentiality provisions
constitutes a penal offense which is subject to prosecution in Italy.
Dr. Brancaccio informed the Department of Justice of additional steps which will be
taken by Minister Bonifacio to safeguard the confidentiality of information supplied
by the Department of Justice.
The Department of Justice representatives expressed satisfaction with the assurances
and the additional steps which will be taken in Italy. They announced that implementation of the agreement will continue.
The Department of Justice stressed that breach of the confidentiality provisions in the
agreement would, pursuant to Article 4, result in a suspension of further exchanges
of information.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release (Apr. 30, 1976).
56 See U.S.-Nigeria Agreement, supra note 23.
57 N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
58 Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1976, at A37, col. 1.
59 N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
60 For a modern statute dealing comprehensively with international cooperation in criminal investigations and proceedings, see Switzerland's Law on International Judicial Assistance
in Criminal Matters, translated and reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1339. It is anticipated that the effective
date of the Law will be January 1, 1983.
61 Cf. id. at arts. 8(1), 63(1), 63(2).

